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Stiglitz mit mert odamondani?
Milyen kritikát gyakorolt?
Komolyan megkérdőjelezte-e a jelenlegi rendszer alapjait?
Rávilágított-e arra, hogy a fejlett országokban visszaszorultak a termelőágazatok és a helyüket a szolgáltatás és a kereskedelem foglalta el és ebben a helyzetben a vezető szerep megtartásához kellettek,kellenek a nagy bankbevételek?
Gazdasági fellendülést kellett mutatni akkor is, mikor a két világrendszer küzdött és az amerikaiak meghirdették a csillagháborút? Itt növekedni kellett mindenáron. Ezeket leírja?
Van-e olyan intézkedéscsomag vagy olyan indító lépés amely meleltt következetesen kiáll, amely valóban elmozdítja a rendszert egy jobb irányba a mostaninál?

A közgazdászok nem hülyék. A közgazdasági egyetemekre mentek az utóbbi évtizedekben világszerte a legjobb tanulók. Tudják ők, hogy mi folyik itt. Stiglitz is tudja, Soros is tudja. Mindegyik közgazdász tudja ,hogy miből van a bankárok és a nagyhatalmak haszna.
Csak közben felnövekedett Kína. Megcáfolva Kornai tételeit , hogy a szocializmusból nem fejlődhet ki jól működő erős gazdaság.
Soros az előadásai végén Kináról beszél. A válság során a világbanknál a kínai reakciókat latolgatták, latolgatják, a vezető államok Kínát a jelenlegi status quo fenntartására próbálják befolyásolni.

Bevágom Ben Fine szócikkét, amit a „Fifty key thinkers in Development” c. könyvbe írt Stiglitz-ről:

JOSEPH STIGLITZ (1943–)

Born in Gary, Indiana on 9 February 1943, Joseph Stiglitz is reputed to have been dubbed by Paul Samuelson the best economist to have originated from the declining steel town. This is, however, the home town of the first Nobel Laureate for the discipline. Stiglitz’s career has been astonishing. As a graduate student he edited Samuelson’s Collected Papers. At twenty-seven, he became full professor at Yale, subsequently taking appointments at Stanford, Oxford, Princeton and Columbia. He received the J.B. Clark award for outstanding economist under the age of forty. He joined Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisors, serving as Chair and a member of Cabinet. In 1997, he became the World Bank’s Chief Economist, promoting the Comprehensive Development Framework with President James Wolfensohn. In the putative turn away from the discredited neo-liberal Washington Consensus, he launched the post-Washington Consensus. This helped to restore legitimacy to the Bretton Woods Institutions as more state-, people- and development-friendly. In 2001, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in part for his role in founding the New Development Economics, an element in his more general information-theoretic approach. In the volume of 2003 honouring his sixtieth birthday, his list of publications runs to almost fifty pages, including multiple editions of textbooks in economics, micro-economics, macroeconomics and the economics of the public sector.
Despite these astonishing achievements, Stiglitz would have remained a significant but minor figure within development studies and economics but for an event that catapulted him to prominence. He was forced to resign from the World Bank at the instigation of Larry Summers, one of his predecessors and, at the time, US Treasury Secretary of State. He insisted that Stiglitz must go if Wolfensohn were to remain in office. The reason is that, from the outset of his appointment at the World Bank, Stiglitz had used his position to criticise the IMF. This became unacceptable once it threatened policy rather than offering rhetoric, and Stiglitz had become particularly outspoken over his opposition to privatisation in the former Soviet Union and the austere macro-economic policies and financial liberalisation imposed upon South Korea following the Asian crisis. Close examination of Stiglitz’s economics reveals paradoxes. First, he is not particularly radical in policy and theory nor are his conclusions particularly original. Close attention to market imperfections leads him to seek balance between market and state, safety nets, proper sequencing and regulation of financial liberalisation in particular and other policies in general as opposed to neo-liberal shock therapy. But from the 1980s onwards, literature critical of the Washington Consensus, especially that concerned with the developmental state and adjustment with a human face, drew similar conclusions. His emphasis on market and institutional imperfections as especially characteristic of developing countries represents a partial rediscovery of the old and classic development economics of what might be termed the pre-Washington consensus of the McNamara period. Thus, Stiglitz’s novelty lies less in the conclusions that he draws than in the information- theoretic approach that he uses to obtain them, and the positions from which he has been able to promote them with considerable and rare intellectual integrity given the personal consequences. Second, in his career, he seems to have become more radical, especially after his break with the World Bank. He has set up an Initiative for Policy Dialogue to promote alternatives to what he now terms neoclassical economics, having redefined it as the idea that markets work perfectly in order to distance himself from it. His critique of the Bretton Woods Institutions, especially the IMF, has intensified. His book, Globalization and Its Discontents, published in 2002, mainly concerned with a critique of the IMF and his own experiences in promoting debate over his disagreements with it, is a best-seller. He has been hailed as the champion of the poor for his stances. But there is no increasing radicalisation in Stiglitz’s economics apart from the loss of a naďve innocence about the power of his own ideas. This is someone who has remained over his entire career committed to Keynesianism at the macro level and the correction of market imperfections by capable government at the micro level. It is the intellectual environment that has changed rather than his position within it, opportunity for prominence aside.
Third, then, within mainstream (development) economics, Stiglitz has been at the forefront of the turn against neo-liberalism since the 1990s. Marx argued of Ricardo that, for his analytics, it was sufficient to read the first two chapters of his Principles. The first deals with the labour theory of value as average labour time of production in industry, and the second, inconsistent with the first by defining value at the margin of cultivation, constructs a theory of rent. All the rest is application with no further theoretical advance. While in part a put-down, Marx also viewed Ricardo as the bourgeois political economist par excellence. This is because he applied his principles and his own version of the labour theory of value ruthlessly to whatever economic phenomena he cared to address. What has this to do with Stiglitz? There are some striking parallels, and contrasts, to be drawn between him and (Marx’s view of) Ricardo. First, Stiglitz can also be understood as relying upon two principles, to the first of which he is obsessively committed. With the second, as will be seen, it is inconsistent although it is mainly implicit and unconscious. Stiglitz understands the capitalist economy in terms of what he himself dubs a new paradigm based on imperfect information. It deploys the idea that exchanges take place between agents who are imperfectly and asymmetrically informed. For this reason, markets are imperfect, and three potentially inefficient sorts of outcome result. Markets may clear (supply equals demand) but be inefficient (some trades beneficial to both parties do not occur). This is so if potential buyers (sellers) of lower (higher) quality goods do not wish to trade at a price reflecting a higher (lower) average quality. Second, markets may not clear but prices not adjust in favour of the short side (price increases if excess demand and decreases for excess supply). An example is efficiency-wages where, despite surplus labour, wages fall because employers anticipate a more than compensating loss in productivity, loyalty and work intensity. Third, markets can be absent, as in health insurance for the aged or sick. Any level of premium would attract an average level of health risk that is too high as the healthier choose to risk selfprovision rather than pay premiums that reflect the sicklier.
For Stiglitz, these are general principles that apply to all markets, their significance depending upon the nature of the imperfections, the goods, the agents, and so forth specific to each market. His voluminous writings reflect one application after another. But a difference from Ricardo is that Stiglitz’s horizons extend beyond capitalism to deal with development and the transitional economies. Further, Stiglitz also addresses the non-economic or non-market responses to market imperfections.
Thus, institutions are perceived to be a, not necessarily efficient, response to market imperfections. His theory of share-cropping summarily dismisses both customary behaviour and exploitation as explanations in favour of monitoring and incentive problems in case tenants know more than landlords over production possibilities and work effort. Share-cropping is also used to argue that informational imperfections in one market, land, can have knock-on effects on others, such as availability of credit, choice of technique and capital intensity.
But other social sciences and political economy are notable for their absence from Stiglitz’s work. His point of departure is the neoclassical economics of perfectly working markets, which he carefully picks to pieces from his own perspective. His own paradigm, however, displays considerable continuities with the neoclassical approach. Like Ricardo, his method is deductive, even more explicitly drawing conclusions from axioms in the form of models. These are embedded in the optimising behaviour of individuals from which micro-foundations underpin macro-outcomes in the form of equilibrium. As with Ricardo, the logic of his deductive system is used to confront chosen topics with scant regard to methodology (deductivism wedded to naďve empiricism and falsifiability) or history of economic thought (with occasional token misinterpretations of Adam Smith as anticipating general equilibrium theory and Hayek the information-theoretic approach, for example).
Stiglitz’s second analytical principle is to abandon his first and appeal to social, structural or other factors than optimising individuals. The need to do so arises in three ways. First, the deductive method always depends upon the exogenous as parameters. How are these to be explained other than to push out the boundaries further only to recreate them anew? Second, the real world has a nasty habit of revealing exploitation and power, and inventiveness and culture, not reducible to a calculus of imperfectly informed optimising agents engaged in individual acts of exchange with one another. As Marx said of Ricardo’s theory of rent, his assumption of free exchange and flow of capital onto the land would have been incomprehensible to his contemporaries anywhere else in the world. By the same token, can share-cropping be understood as free of exploitation and cultural factors, and development or lack of it the consequence of imperfections, and independent of power and associated conflicts?
Third, Stiglitz’s own experience outside the academic world of neoclassical economics leads him to recognise the failure of his logic to prevail, most notably in the acknowledged rise to power of a financial system with its own compelling interests or the irrational dogma of his opponents. Significantly, these analytically residual categories leap to prominence in his more reflective and recent contributions. Globalization and Its Discontents has no theory, scarcely a concept, of globalisation (other than reduction in transport and communication costs) and, by contrast, the term is effectively absent from all of his earlier work. This, and the account of his period as advisor to Clinton, is entirely free of the information-theoretic approach.
But, if he is ultimately drawn to recognise social power and interests, these should surely serve as analytical starting point rather than conclusion of informationally constrained optimisation.
In short, in the intellectual assault upon neo-liberalism, Stiglitz has played the leading role from within mainstream economics. He has not promoted alternatives other than his own. His command of these, methodology, history of economic thought, and the other social sciences is limited. For some, this puts him in the vanguard, for others he holds back a more radical and wide-ranging critique of neo-liberalism. Ultimately, his lasting contribution will depend upon the extent to which others build upon, and break with, his partial and distorted restoration of the classic understandings of development.

Major works
For his own ‘Memoir’, see http://www-1.gsb.columbia.edu/f.PDF.
Chang, H.-J. (ed.) (2001) Joseph Stiglitz and the World Bank: The Rebel Within, London: Anthem Press. (A collection of his essays promoting the post-Washington Consensus.)
Stiglitz, J. (1986) ‘The New Development Economics’, World Development 14(2): 257–65. (A concise and early account of his approach to economics and development.)
——(1994) Whither Socialism?, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (For a fuller account with application to transitional economies.)
——(2001) ‘Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics’, available at http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/2001/stiglitz-lecture.pdf
. (His own overview of his work, provided in his Nobel Prize Lecture.)
—— (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents, New York: W.W. Norton and Co. (His critique of the IMF.)
—— (2003) The Roaring Nineties: Seeds of Destruction, New York: W.W. Norton and Co. (For a narrative of his time on the Council of Economic Advisers.)
Further reading
For an appreciative assessment, see ‘Markets with Asymmetric Information’, available on the Nobel website, http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2001/press.html, ‘Advanced Information’.
Arnott, R. et al. (eds) (2003) Economics for an Imperfect World: Essays in Honor of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Essays in honour of his sixtieth birthday, including a full bibliography of his work.)
Fine, B. (2002) ‘Economics Imperialism and the New Development Economics as Kuhnian Paradigm Shift’, World Development 30(12): 2057–70. (For critical assessments of the information-theoretic approach as paradigm.)
Fine, B. et al. (eds) (2001) Development Policy in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond the Post-Washington Consensus, London: Routledge. (For a critique of the post-Washington Consensus.)
Fine, B. and Jomo, K. (eds) (2005) The New Development Economics: A Critical Introduction, Delhi, Tulikar and London: Zed Books.
Wade, R. (2001) ‘Showdown at the World Bank’, New Left Review 7: 124–37. (For his ‘resignation’ from the World Bank.)

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ugyanő írt egy cikket a 2006-os Socialist Register-be (Correcting Stiglitz), azt is érdemes elolvasni.